Graham John Bower is in 1848 gebore in Ierland, hoewel die Bowers oorspronklik van Skotse herkoms was. Sy pa het die rang van admiraal beklee en het voorsien dat sy seun ook in die Koninklike weermag betrokke sal wees. Bower word dus na die vloot akademie by Gosport in Hampshire gestuur en hy sluit aan by die Koninklike Vloot. In die 1870s is hy kaptein van die HMS Conflict en lê hy gereeld besoek af in Sydney. Hier ontmoet hy sy toekomstige vrou en raak bevriend met Sir Hercules Robinson, wat sedert 1872 die Goewerneur van Nieu-Suid-Wallis was.
Sir Graham Bower (1848-1933)
Robinson word aangestel as Goewerneur van die Kaap kolonie en Hoë Kommissaris van Suid-Afrika. Graham Bower word dan ook, op Robinson se aanbeveling, die pos as Imperial Sekretaris vir die Hoë Kommissaris aangebied. Hy aanvaar die aanbod en verhuis in Januarie 1881 na die Kaap. Hy word ook in 1892 ‘n ridderskap, The Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St George, toegeken.
Sir Hercules Robinson
Bower en Robinson land in Suid-Afrika net na die sogenaamde Federasie oorloë, wat die anneksasie van die Transkei Xhosa (1878) insluit, asook die Anglo-Zoeloe oorlog (1879) en die rampspoedige Eerste Anglo-Boereoorlog (1880-81). Beide ondersteun ook die nuut-verkose Britse Eerste Minister Gladstone se goedhartigheid jeens die Transvaal. Tydens sy verblyf in Suid-Afrika (1880-98) ondersteun Bower toenemend die beweging vir verantwoordelike selfregering in die Britse nedersettings. Die Britse inlywing van die Transvaal (1877) en die daaropvolgende Eerste Anglo-Boereoorlog lei tot ‘n begeerte om nouer bande met die Boere te smee, in die hoop dat Suid-Afrikaanse probleme en verskille deur die inwoners van die land geskik kan word.
Suid Afrika op die vooraand van die Konfederasie Oorloë (1878)
Hierdie publikasie van Graham Bower se Secret History doen verslag van sy insig in die binnewerking van die skandaal van die Jameson-inval (1895-6) en die oorsake van die Tweede Anglo-Boereoorlog (1899-1902). Hoewel hy die sekretaris van die Britse Hoë Kommissaris was, het Bower gekies om stil te bly en die rol van sondebok te aanvaar. Rhodes het sy plan om die Rhodesiese magte in die Transvaal in te stuur, later bekend as die Jameson-inval, vertroulik aan Bower vertel. Bower het egter nie die plan oopgevlek nie, en het beide Rhodes en Robinson beskerm by die offisiële Britse ondersoek in 1897. Hierdie ‘edele leuen’ het hom sy loopbaan gekos en ook persoonlik skade aangedoen. In 1898 word hy aangestel as die Koloniale Sekretaris van Mauritius, ‘n pos wat hy tot met sy aftrede in 1910 beklee het.
Joseph Chamberlain
Die redakteurs het hierdie VRV-publikasie saamgestel uit Bower se ongepubliseerde manuskripte, sy persoonlike dokumente, offisiële rekords – insluitende die transkripsie van die 1897 ‘Lying-in-State’ ondersoek – asook mondelingse oorvertellings deur die Bower-familie.
In Februarie 1901 stuur Bower sy Secret History aan sy seuns met ‘n versoek dat dit eers na sy dood gepubliseer sal word. Die dekbrief vanuit Mauritius bevat die volgende kommentaar:
“The extraordinary series of blunders and deceits which have led up to the present calamitous War have hitherto remained secret.”
“The English people have blundered under the leadership of self-seeking and unscrupulous men.”
“I am therefore writing the secret history of our present calamities.”
UITTREKSEL UIT DIE TEKS
“In October 1895 Mr. Rhodes came into my office and said, ‘I want you to give me your word of honour you will not divulge what I am going to tell you Referring to the transfer of the protectorate, he then told me that the capitalists at Johannesburg had joined forces with the National Union, 9 and that a revolt would take place. My distinct idea is that he told me that the rising would not take place for two years, but his friends deny this, and although I am firm in my recollection, I do not feel sufficiently confident to swear to it. He also told me that he was going to move the police from Matabeleland to Mafeking, to be available for use if required. As he said, ‘You fellows are infernally slow. If you fellows won’t act I will. I am not going to see my countrymen shot down.’ As regards Rhodes’s sneer about our being too slow; no one who knew Rhodes would attach importance to that. He hated red tape, and was always sneering at official ways. I ought to add that Rhodes told me that his brother, Frank Rhodes, refused to start for Johannesburg until Sir Hercules had been told. It was this ultimatum of his brother’s that sent Rhodes to me.
He then said, ’Am Ito tell the governor?’ At first I hesitated, and turning my back on him, looked out of the window to think. My desire throughout was that the imperial government should keep clear of all these revolutions. I had no objection to the Johannesburg people going into revolt, if they thought fit. That was their affair. But I wished to keep the high commissioner clear and free to act as arbitrator. There is only a thin sheet of paper between previous knowledge and complicity. But, on reflection, I felt the high commissioner ought to know, and said, ’You must tell the governor; it being understood that I would keep his interview with Sir Hercules secret. He said, ‘all right’ . . . [and] told me that his plans were approved by Chamberlain and Lord Rosebery who knew his intentions . . .
He then turned to go into the governor’s room. I saw him go in. The interview with the governor lasted about half an hour. There are two doors to the governor’s room. He went in by the door in the private secretary’s office and went out by the door in the passage. It was the invariable practice for Sir Hercules when he saw Rhodes, or a minister of any importance, to send for m when his visitor had left, to repeat the conversation and to ask me what I thought of it. He did not do so on this occasion. As the governor did not send for me, I went to see Rhodes, who stopped me with the remark — ‘He has taker it rather badly, and does not wish the subject mentioned to him’. I have since learnt that he made a similar communication to his brother Col. Rhodes, saying he had told the governor everything.
Now both Sir Hercules and Rhodes subsequently gave different accounts of their interview. As I was not present, I can not say what passed, but the next I day I went into the governor’s room to test his knowledge, and commence speaking about Johannesburg. He stopped me, saying, ’The less you and I hav4 to do with these damned conspiracies of Rhodes and Chamberlain the better This accorded with my views, and satisfied me that Rhodes had informed th4 governor. The governor added, ‘I know nothing about it and was very angry and impatient at my mentioning the subject. But he ordered me to allow the troops to come down to Pitsani, and to authorise the contractor to place the forage of our imperial post office relay stations at their service, to facilitate their march.
Now in this matter I wish to be clear about Lord Rosebery. In 1896 Sir Hercules, then Lord Rosmead, lunched with Lord Rosebery and mentioned the subject. Lord Rosebery said, ‘Yes, Rhodes said something, but I gave no opinion.’ I therefore hold Lord Rosebery blameless. There was no harm ii having troops on the border. The wrong was in subsequently hurrying up revolution in a friendly state in order to take advantage of that revolution t~ intervene. If the revolution had come naturally of itself, then intervention would have been a duty, but in this matter Lord Rosebery is blameless an4 Mr. Chamberlain wrong.
Late in October, or early in November, a private letter arrived from Chamberlain asking the governor’s views on a revolt at Johannesburg, ’with or with out assistance from outside? This letter was written from San Sebastian an was fairly long and friendly— but there had always been a feeling of distrust o: the part of Sir Hercules towards Chamberlain — very naturally so, I may say I This letter seemed to be a confirmation of Rhodes’s statement that he had told Chamberlain.
Sir Hercules gave me the letter, and desired me to draw up a memorandum of a suitable answer. I did so. I practically repeated my memorandum, written…
Redigering deur Deryck Schreuder en Jeffrey Butler
Professor Deryck M. Schreuder is die 16de Vise-Kanselier en President van die Universiteit van Wes-Australië. Hy publiseer oor verskeie aspekte van Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis, onder andere The Scramble for Africa, 1887-95: the Politics of Partition Reappraised.
Jeffrey Butler, nou afgetree, was betrokke by die Wesleyan Universiteit, Middletown, Connecticut. Hy publiseer ook oor Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis. Sy mees onlangse werk is Liberalism in South Africa (1987).